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REVIEW ARTICLE
STRUGGLING AGAINST U. S. LABOR’S  
DECLINE UNDER LATE CAPITALISM:  
LESSONS FOR THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY
U. S. labor is in serious trouble. Over the last thirty years, private sector 
un ion density has continually plummeted, registering below seven percent 
in 2010. This is largely due to the hemorrhaging of members in the key 
manufacturing unions of the former Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO), coupled with a lack of significant organizing success in established 
or newly emerging private sector industries. Although much smaller than 
the private sector, the public sector has continued to be a relatively bright 
spot for U. S. trade unionism at the end of the 21st century’s first decade, 
with union density for federal, state and municipal government employees 
being more than five times higher than for their private sector counter-
parts, at 36.2%.
But this greater union strength among public workers might soon 
evaporate with the recent attacks on public sector unions by Republican 
administrations in the states of Wisconsin, Ohio, and Tennessee. As of this 
writing in April 2011, if these assaults prove ultimately successful, more state 
administrations will undoubtedly feel emboldened to follow suit.
This fall in private sector union density, of course, has had serious con-
sequences for U. S. labor; it has contributed to a dramatic weakening of 
collective bargaining power and to the undermining of the use of the strike 
as a tactical weapon. Moreover, it appears to be the major factor in dissi-
dent unions leaving the AFL-CIO in the summer of 2005 and subsequently 
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establishing the Change to Win Federation (CTW) several months later.1 This 
crisis, at least from labor’s viewpoint, has generated much discussion among 
trade union officials, activists and sympathetic outsiders concerning the tac-
tics to pursue for revitalizing the labor movement in the early 21st century.
The three books2 reviewed in this essay provide meaningful contribu-
tions and extensions to the crucial dialog on what is needed for U. S. trade 
union movement revival in an era of neoliberal globalization and increasing 
employment insecurity. What Andrew Battista’s The Revival of Labor Liberal-
ism, Steve Early’s Embedded with organized Labor: Journalistic Reflections on the 
Class War at Home, and Steve K. Ashby and C. J. Hawking’s Staley: The Fight for 
a New American Labor Movement make painstakingly clear is that the renewal 
of the U. S. labor movement — if there is to be one at this time — cannot 
simply occur through modest labor law modifications, such as the passing 
of the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), or electing allegedly “pro-labor” 
Democratic Party politicians to the White House or to the U. S. Congress. 
Although these volumes do not share the same theoretical perspectives, all 
provide convincing evidence that modest reforms will be unable, in and of 
themselves, to successfully resuscitate a flagging U. S. trade union movement. 
Tinkering around the edges of U. S. labor’s strategy and tactics will hardly 
begin to address the fundamental problems. Clearly, what is needed is a 
thoroughgoing transformation, with active involvement and engagement of 
the unions’ rank-and-file membership at levels that have largely been absent 
for more than the past few decades.
All three books are extremely critical of the stifling business unionism 
that had dominated the movement from the time of the AFL-CIO merger 
through the “New Voice” slate’s election to the federation’s leadership po-
sitions in 1995. As an alternative, they call for implementation of a social 
movement unionism. Although “social movement unionism” may have differ-
ent definitions, the shared meaning is that workers and their organizations 
form alliances with other community groups in the pursuit of economic 
and social justice.
Battista rejects the entrenched business unionism of the first two AFL-
CIO administrations of George Meany and Lane Kirkland, preferring instead 
the model espoused by Walter Reuther, the former United Auto Workers 
1 For articles offering various perspectives, albeit with nuanced differences, on the Change 
to Win Federation as a rival federation to the AFL-CIO, see Chaison, 2007; Hurd, 2007; 
McNeill, 2007; Estreicher, 2006; Greer, 2006; Masters, Gibney & Zagenczyk, 2006.
2 The Revival of Labor Liberalism, by Andrew Battista. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 2008. $45.00. Pp. x, 268.
 Embedded with organized Labor: Journalistic Reflections on the Class War at Home, by Steve Early. 
New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009. Paper, $17.95.  Pp. x, 288. 
 Staley: The Fight for a New American Labor Movement, by Steven K. Ashby and C. J. Hawking. 
Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2009. $75.00; paper, $25.00. Pp. 384.
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(UAW) president and leading force of the short-lived, reform-minded Al-
liance for Labor Action (ALA), created in 1968 (Devinatz, 2006; Treckel, 
1975). Using the ALA as a model, Battista places his faith in a progressive 
union bureaucracy in coalition with other sympathetic organizations.
Early, as well as Ashby and Hawking, support a bottom-up revival of the 
trade union movement, calling for active participation of the membership in 
all aspects of union affairs, including alliances with other groups for attain-
ing economic and social justice. Both sets of authors recognize and appreci-
ate the positive roles that progressive union leaders can play; they realize, 
however, that this by itself is hardly enough to bring about the required and 
necessary transformations.
In The Revival of Labor Liberalism, Battista, a political scientist, documents 
the attempts to revitalize the labor–liberal coalition in the United States from 
the late 1970s through the late 1980s by examining the Progressive Alliance 
(PA), the Citizen Labor Energy Coalition (CLEC) and the National Labor 
Committee (NLC). These organizations were established at a time when the 
so-called labor–management accord was in effect, from 1945 to circa 1975,3 
and the “success” of the trade union movement was beginning to unravel. 
Besides declining union density, by the early 1980s U. S. labor’s decades-long 
gains obtained through inter- and intra-industry pattern bargaining were being 
threatened through the advent of concession bargaining and the implemen-
tation of labor–management cooperation programs.4 These developments, 
however, were unsuccessful in reviving a flagging trade union movement.
With the breakdown of Keynesianism signaled by the onset of the 
1974–75 economic recession and the arrival of stagflation coupled with the 
emergence of a business–conservative alliance in the late 1970s, the PA, in 
October 1978, created a coalition of more than one hundred labor, civil 
rights, feminist, environmental, and community-organizing groups in an 
attempt to regenerate a fading labor liberalism. The group’s three objectives 
were 1) to serve as an “anticorporate coalition” that would provide labor and 
liberals with the opportunity to counteract capital’s attacks; 2) to act as a 
labor–liberal bloc within the Democratic party in encouraging party reform; 
and 3) to restore the labor–liberal coalition to exert a more influential role 
in national politics.
3 For conflicting interpretations of what the breakdown of this alleged postwar labor– 
management accord meant for one leader in the union bureaucracy’s progressive wing, 
see Cowie, 2003; Devinatz, 2004.
4 Relevant articles discussing concession bargaining during the early 1980s include Craft, Ab-
boushi and Labovitz, 1985; Cappelli, 1985. Labor–management cooperation programs have 
been generally depicted positively by industrial relations scholars. For example, see Duane, 
1993; Brock, 1990; Cooke, 1990; Schuster, 1984. Scholarly literature appearing from a pro-
union perspective that is critical of labor–management cooperation program participation 
include Parker and Slaughter, 1988, 1994; Wells, 1987; Parker, 1985.
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Founded in April 1978, six months before the PA, the CLEC was another 
attempt at revitalizing the labor–liberal coalition in battling the hegemonic 
energy industry during the 1978–79 energy crisis. While the PA and CLEC 
were devoted to uniting labor and liberals in the pursuit of a progres sive 
domestic agenda, political events in Nicaragua and El Salvador in 1979–80 
resulted in dissident unions forming a liberal organization in opposition to 
the Reagan Administration’s and the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy objectives in 
Central America. Although the NLC’s activities were first directed at ending 
military aid to the Duarte regime and towards encouraging a negotiated 
settlement to El Salvador’s bloody civil war, the organization later included 
the goal of ending U. S. military aid to the Contras fighting to topple the 
Sandinista government.
Battista’s analysis of his three case studies is missing one crucial element: 
the role of the rank-and-file union membership. The NLC was composed 
almost solely of national union presidents; additionally, the first two groups 
also were basically top-down organizations imposed by progressive union 
leaders, without membership involvement.
This point, however, might not be crucial for Battista, whose reform 
strategy does not depend upon rank-and-file participation per se. As previ-
ously mentioned, Battista identifies with the Reuther wing of the U. S. trade 
union movement. Viewing the short-lived ALA as a positive representation 
of Reuther’s reform strategy, Battista fails to notice that the ALA functioned 
in a top-down manner that was guided by union leaders and staff (includ-
ing Reuther himself) rather than motivated by rank-and-file members who 
were increasingly restive by the late 1960s. Furthermore, this was the same 
approach that Reuther adopted for administering the UAW, from the time 
he was elected president in 1946 until his untimely death in 1970. While 
Reuther formally espoused support and provided financial backing for an 
array of liberal causes, such as the civil rights movement, within his own union 
many rank-and-file members felt that the UAW president and his staff were 
uninterested in addressing problematic shop floor issues, including ra cial 
discrimination within the plants.
Consistent with this analysis, Battista perceives the “New Voice” slate’s 
election to the AFL-CIO leadership as extremely positive, ultimately constitut-
ing the victory of the Reuther faction of dissident (or reform) unions over 
those in the Meany–Kirkland camp. Again, however, Battista fails to recognize 
that the Sweeney administration’s strategy for reforming the AFL-CIO was 
also a primarily top-down affair.
Perhaps Battista promotes this reform strategy because he sees no vi-
able alternative. In an econometric study, Goldfield (1987) addressed the 
reasons for the U. S. labor movement’s decline nearly a quarter of a century 
ago. After investigating factors such as structural changes in the economy, 
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the social composition of the work force, etc., Goldfield concluded that or-
ganized labor’s deterioration was ultimately due to the changing relation of 
class forces in the United States as indicated by employers more vigorously 
opposing union organizing drives, changes in U. S. labor law that benefit 
employers, and the unions’ refusal to devote the necessary resources to bat-
tling membership loss.
Based on his findings, Goldfield speculated that business unionism’s 
consolidation occurred within the CIO unions after the defeats suffered by 
the working class during the 1940s and 1950s, which ultimately culminated 
in the destruction of rank-and-file movements within the industrial unions. 
This conjecture implies that unions might have more effectively waged the 
class struggle against the employers’ offensive throughout the late 20th–early 
21st centuries if a sufficient level of rank-and-file activity had been sustained. 
Thus, in the absence of significant rank-and-file struggles in the late 1970s 
and the 1980s, when it came to reforming the AFL-CIO, the only agent able 
to carry out this agenda remained the liberal–progressive wing of the trade 
un ion bureaucracy.
Many of the essays in Early’s book, Embedded with organized Labor, were 
originally published in other outlets. Most of these tell the story of the 
U. S. labor movement’s development through reviews of important books 
in the field. He divides his volume into five sections (e.g., “Labor and the 
Left, Old and New;” “Race, Class, and Gender,” etc.) which cover all of the 
relevant issues confronting the labor movement today. In comparison with 
the other two books discussed in this essay, Early provides a broader histori-
cal perspective on the U. S. trade union movement’s rise and decline. If 
there is a unifying theme in his essays, it is that union democracy is not only 
highly desirable but absolutely necessary for reforming the labor movement 
and for its subsequent revival. Because Communist Party–led unions were 
generally more democratic than non-Communist ones (Stepan-Norris and 
Zeitlin, 2002), Early shows an abiding respect for Old Left labor leaders (and 
their organizations).
While clearly sympathetic to the Communists of the Old Left and the 
industrial unions5 that it led, Early is much less generous with the “New 
5 There have been various treatments of the role of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) in 
the CIO from differing ideological viewpoints. Kampelman (1957) views the CPUSA’s par-
ticipation in the CIO with extreme hostility, while Cochran (1977), an ex-Trotskyist who had 
been active in the United Auto Workers, is also exceedingly critical of the Party’s strategies. 
Levenstein (1981) delivers a balanced analysis, whereas Klehr (1984), who contends that 
the Party’s trade union policy was ultimately determined in Moscow, outlines the CPUSA’s 
increasingly central role in the establishment and expansion of the CIO during the mid- 
and late 1930s. Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (2002) discuss the many positive contributions of 
the CPUSA to the CIO, while pointing out how Party-led industrial unions obtained better 
contracts than those not led by the CPUSA. 
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Left” communists during the 1970s and 1980s in his essay dealing with Max 
Elbaum’s Revolution in the Air. Early criticizes these “Third World Marxists” 
of the “New Communist Movement” (NCM)6 for being far more interested 
in pursuing the correct political line through engaging in minute doctrinal 
dis putes than in building rank-and-file reform movements within the unions 
and mass-based community organizations.
When the NCM did engage in labor work, its efforts were exemplified, 
according to Early, “by spectacular adventurism and ‘ultra-leftism,’ combined 
with a similar penchant for manipulation and behind-the-scenes maneuver-
ing that hardly had a liberating effect on the working class” (50). As Elbaum 
acknowledges, the “New Communists” often discouraged any “bottom-up” 
organizing and “working class self-organization” (50) that NCM vanguard 
parties were unable to control. For example, the Maoist October League was 
savagely critical of Edward Sadlowski’s reform efforts in the United Steel-
workers of America during the 1976–77 “Fight Back” campaign, denouncing 
him and other union reformers in his camp as “the main scabs and slickest 
defenders of the system” while referring to Sadlowski’s candidacy as “a trick 
by the bourgeoisie to channel the revolutionary aspirations and strivings of 
the masses into reformism” (51).
Moreover, the grassroots efforts of New Left rank-and-file organizers 
during the 1970s and 1980s often revealed contradictions in attempts to 
pursue both broader societal transformation and trade union reform at the 
point of production. These “colonizers,” often middle-class individuals who 
believed that social change had to originate within the working class, turned 
their former campus activism into organizing at industrial work sites. As Early 
points out in his essay reviewing Staughton and Alice Lynd’s The New Rank 
and File, colonizers who discussed Fidel and Mao did not endear themselves 
to their co-workers and might also experience physical attacks if not careful. 
By downplaying their socialist and communist principles, on the other hand, 
these organizers often successfully built reform caucuses within their unions 
and were elected to leadership positions while neglecting to articulate an 
alternative vision of society.
By the time of Sweeney’s 1995 victory, a number of these former coloniz-
ers had been appointed as AFL-CIO field representatives and department 
heads, ready to lead the charge in reshaping the federation, not from the 
shop floor this time but from the corridors of power. There is little doubt 
that, ceteris paribus, having left-wing union staff members as leaders was an 
improvement on more conservative unionists occupying such important 
6 Although deriving its inspiration from the Russian, Chinese and Cuban Revolutions, the 
NCM was a (primarily Maoist) Marxist–Leninist tendency coming out of the New Left dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s. These NCM organizations are outlined in O’Brien, 1977–1978.
 U. S. LABOR'S DECLINE 399
positions. Unfortunately, no matter how progressive the intentions of this 
recently appointed union officialdom, following the lead of Sweeney and his 
“New Voice” administration, these former New Leftists actively constructed a 
social movement unionism from above rather than a social movement unionism 
from below. Adopting essentially the same strategy used while in NCM groups, 
perhaps these New Left activists believed that with the enlightened Sweeney 
administration replacing the previous conservative regimes of Meany and 
Kirkland, they would be able to solve all of the trade unions’ current problems 
simply by using their knowledge, expertise and commitment. In essence, 
these New Leftists, although without a party, would substitute themselves as 
the “vanguard” for the direct participation and energy of the rank-and-file 
membership.
This social movement unionism from above was ultimately determined 
by the AFL-CIO’s officialdom, rather than depending on the active participa-
tion of rank-and-file union members. As an example, while Sweeney hoped 
to significantly expand union membership through allocating more financial 
resources to union organizing, his strategy consisted of using professional orga-
nizers rather than turning rank-and-file unionists into organizers themselves. 
He remained committed to this tactic although a study, commissioned by the 
AFL-CIO, found that unions prevailed in 73% of the certification elections 
in which rank-and-file organizers were used, compared to 27% when only 
professional organizers were employed (Moody, 1998).
A second characteristic of this social movement unionism from above, 
as detailed by Moody (1998), was Sweeney’s reliance on Washington-based 
tactics which also excluded rank-and-file input in either their development 
or execution. He clearly felt more at ease with ostensible experts from insti-
tutes and policy centers in arriving at recommended solutions to the labor 
movement’s woes and then publicly announcing them through expensive 
media and marketing campaigns. Although they were extremely professional, 
these presentations were unable to generate a sustained energy among trade 
unionists themselves.
Indisputably, in spite of its inadequacies, this brand of social movement 
unionism is superior to the ingrained and corrosive business unionism that 
it replaced. But Sweeney’s strategy was insufficient for tackling the endemic 
challenges that will continue to confront unions. Trade unionists determined 
to reverse the status quo must articulate an alternative vision to social move-
ment unionism from above if they hope to transcend the current state of labor 
affairs during the current Trumka and future post-Trumka administrations.
Besides suffering political defeats, disappointments over unfulfilled 
union reform efforts, and an internally divided U. S. trade union movement 
during the past 30 years, union activists also have had to confront an era of 
disastrous work stoppages, including the strike of the Professional Air Traffic 
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Controllers Organization (Round, 1999; Nordlund, 1998; Shostak and Skocik, 
1986), the Greyhound bus drivers’ walkout, the Local P-9 work stoppage 
against Hormel (Rachleff, 1993; Green 1990) and the United Paper workers’ 
Local 14 strike against International Paper (Getman, 1998). Additional work 
stoppages throughout the 1990s went down to defeat: Staley, Caterpillar, 
(Devinatz, 2005; Cohen, 2002; Franklin, 2001) and Detroit Newspapers — 
although the victorious 1997 UPS strike (Witt and Wilson, 1999, 1998; Roth-
stein, 1997) remains an outlier. Ashby and Hawking’s volume, Staley: The Fight 
for a New American Labor Movement, deals with one of these landmark industrial 
conflicts (and defeats) in the mid-1990s, the A. E. Staley Company lockout 
of the Allied Industrial Workers Local 837, in Decatur’s (Illinois) “war zone.”
Ashby and Hawking, who were activists in support of the locked-out 
workers, recount the events leading up to the dispute, the lockout itself 
and its aftermath in tremendous and colorful detail. The tactics and 
strategies used by the Staley workers before and during the lockout are 
uniformly applauded by union reformers and are indicative of a healthy 
rank-and-file union democracy and social movement unionism. During a 
collective bargaining dispute a union failing to encourage rank-and-file 
participation in the decision-making process and refusing to attempt to 
build coalitions within the community, which then loses, is one thing. 
But what if the union does all the things labor should be doing and is still 
defeated? This is the situation that confronted the Staley workers, who 
fought valiantly and still were vanquished. Unfortunately, virtue alone 
does not guarantee victory.
Ashby and Hawking argue that the union’s major mistake was wasting 
valuable time and energy on State Farm Insurance, which had more ambigu-
ous ties to Tate & Lyle, Staley’s parent company, than on potentially more 
fruitful targets such as Miller Beer. But the more pressing problem haunting 
Local 837 throughout its two-and-one-half–year lockout was that it was un-
able to exert enough pressure to interfere sufficiently with the company’s 
production in Decatur, the other 23 plants located throughout the United 
States or for that matter with Tate & Lyle’s global operations in 50 countries. 
The company’s other U. S. factories were either nonunion or had agreements 
negotiated by other labor organizations with varying expiration dates. More-
over, the contentious issue concerning the introduction of 12-hour rotating 
shifts had already been implemented in 20 company plants. Finally, the lack 
of union solidarity within the plant resulted in building trades craft unionists 
continuing to work during the lockout, which further eroded Local 837’s 
bargaining strength.
Unfortunately, Ashby and Hawking’s story is similar to that of Rachleff 
(1993), who played a similar activist role, as reported in his book on the strike 
of Local P-9 of the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) union 
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against Hormel in Austin (Minnesota) in 1985–86. Barbara Kopple covers the 
same ground in her award-winning documentary, “American Dream.” While 
the Local 837 members initiated social movement unionism from below as 
did the Hormel strikers, what these stories tell us is that such unionism is not 
always successful in achieving union victories in labor disputes. The Staley 
lockout and the Hormel strike indicated that extensive rank-and-file partici-
pation in creating a social unionism will not necessarily lead to victory if the 
workers are unable to negatively impact production at the targeted facility.
While Rachleff (1993, 88) is highly critical of “American Dream,” refer-
ring to it as “tell(ing) a distorted and disempowering story,” the documentary 
recounts the tensions and difficulties in constructing a viable social move-
ment unionism from below. Internal divisions within Local P-9, combined 
with the fact that 450 (out of 1500) members eventually crossed the picket 
line, helped to undermine the strike and any of the advantages derived from 
a bottom-up social movement unionism.
Other lessons concerning the benefits and the limits in constructing 
a social movement unionism from below can be derived from Fink (2003), 
who investigates the largely Guatemalan immigrant work force’s attempt to 
unionize Case Farms in Morganton (North Carolina). While the Laborers 
Union achieved victory in the 1995 certification election because the Case 
Farms workers had become effective rank-and-file organizers themselves, the 
employees, unfortunately, were unsuccessful in attaining a collective bargain-
ing agreement, although they used corporate and consumer campaigns while 
building international solidarity to back their cause. When the Laborers 
pulled out in 2001, the union, nevertheless, funded a Workers Center that 
continued to support the workers’ social movement union activities. Even 
without a contract, their practice of social movement unionism enabled 
them to remain united and to continue to exert pressure on the company.
Nonetheless, one Laborers’ staff member, Yanira Merino, acknowledged 
her frustration with the structural obstacles preventing the negotiation of 
a contract. “It’s sad,” she said. “Basically you’ve got no protection under 
the NLRB, no tools within the law that we can use to push companies like 
Case Farms” (Fink, 2003, 197). And as Brody (2005) argues, the Wagner Act 
model of U. S. labor legislation impedes worker self-organization as well as 
the establishment of social movement unionism from below. As he clearly 
elucidates in his extensive discussions of the evolution of U. S. labor law, the 
deck was stacked against workers organizing unions and achieving collective 
bargaining agreements shortly after the National Labor Relations Act’s imple-
mentation in 1935. And with labor organizations confronting bureaucratic 
processes to obtain employer recognition and contracts, unions often depend 
on bureaucratic methods for reforming this fundamentally flawed system, 
such as supporting the passage of the Employee Free Choice Act, rather than 
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engaging in activities that will actually contribute to worker self-organization. 
For example, unlike in most of the world’s industrial democracies, U. S. labor 
law permits workers to be permanently replaced during economic strikes 
and temporarily replaced during lockouts, as occurred during the Hormel 
strike and the Staley lockout, respectively.
With Sweeney’s retirement in the fall of 2009, it has become clear that 
14 years of reform efforts at the federation in the spirit of the Reuther tradi-
tion have failed to halt the continuing slide of the trade union movement. 
Moreover, in spite of the UFCW’s major organizing victory at Smithfield Foods 
in North Carolina in 2008 (Workers Vanguard, 2009) the CTW’s prospects as 
a whole are no better than that of the AFL-CIO, with the CTW appearing 
to be much more similar to the short-lived ALA than to the CIO during its 
halcyon days of the mid-1930s to mid-1940s (Devinatz, 2010).
The one brighter spot in the U. S. trade union movement, as mentioned 
above, is the relative strength and stability of public sector union density over 
the last two decades. In fact, beginning in 2009, for the first time in U. S. 
history, there were more government workers than private sector employees 
who are union members. This, of course, is due not to the dramatic increase 
in the number of public sector union members but to the continuing erosion 
of private sector union membership, accelerated by the continued hemor-
rhaging of unionized jobs in the manufacturing and related industries during 
the Great Recession of 2008–09.
Public sector unionists have even taken the first steps in reviving a rank-
and-file activism that has not been seen for at least two decades through their 
participation in February 2011 rallies in support of Wisconsin government 
union members maintaining their collective bargaining rights. To have a 
chance at successfully defeating the current assault on public sector unions 
that is likely to continue in the near future, energized rank-and-file public 
workers must unite with private sector trade unionists and other progressive 
organizations to defend their hard-won gains achieved through decades of 
struggle.
The point is not to idealize rank-and-file militancy because it sounds 
enviable from a theoretical and moral perspective. As Early points out, the 
Service Employees International Union has seen expanded growth through 
an extremely top-down model of union organization which often involves 
cutting deals with employers. But to what end? The ultimate goal of increas-
ing union density should be to advance the interests of the union member-
ship (and other workers as well), not to acquire more members so that the 
union is larger on paper and can collect more dues. Stated another way, 
is it desirable to have a numerically sizeable union movement only for the 
sake of increased membership, although it would be largely ineffective in 
engaging in the class struggle?
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Easy answers for the U. S. labor movement’s revitalization, unfortunately, 
remain elusive. A top-down unionism, even of a social movement variety, 
implemented by a progressive union officialdom appears insufficient. In fact, 
in the UFCW’s organizing success at Smithfield Foods, it was largely minor-
ity and immigrant rank-and-file workers taking ownership of the organizing 
drive, rather than relying on a union staff-driven campaign, that culminated 
in employer recognition of the union. The same can be said concerning the 
successful plant occupation that United Electrical Workers (UE) Local 1110 
conducted against Republic Door and Window in Chicago in December 
2008, where a largely immigrant work force, in fighting for the wages and 
severance pay that the company owed them, took control of the situation, 
after the factory’s abrupt closure (Lydersen, 2009). Such a bottom-up social 
movement unionism hardly guarantees success in all situations, as in the case 
of the Staley lockout. Nevertheless, it does, perhaps, offer the best route for 
true union movement revival, given the remaining options available and the 
obstacles that lie ahead.
Victor G. Devinatz
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